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the differences oftreatment should be 
"respected by limiting protection where 
the text contains a limit and leaving 
textually unlimited protection just 
where the Congress apparently chose 
to leave it." Id. at 575. 
This decision had immediate rami-
fications in Maryland because it im-
plicitly affirmed the fourth circuit's 
holding in Kolkhorst v. Tilghman, 897 
F.2d 1282, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 
(1992). In that case, the fourth circuit 
held that the Baltimore City Police 
Department could not limit the number 
of police officers, other than new hires, 
who are allowed to join active military 
reserve units. In so doing, the fourth 
circuit construed section 2024( d), as 
the Supreme Court did in King, as 
placing no limit on reservists covered 
under the section. 
With the decreasing need for a fully 
staffed and active military in modem 
political climates, this decision also 
has major implications for military 
policy. It ensures a fully trained and 
prepared defense structure while en-
abling cuts in military spending. This 
would increase the amount of money 
which would be available to the private 
sector for things such as loans for small 
businesses. The burdens placed on 
employers by the Act could, therefore, 
be compensated by more government 
spending in the private sector. 
ing and the election process in order to 
come within the Act's province. 
Before engaging in its analysis, the 
Court ventured into the history and 
pertinent parts of the Voting Rights 
Act (" Act"). The Act was created to 
remove race discrimination from vot-
ing. Section 5 of the Act requires that 
any changes in voting procedure with 
respect to "voting qualification or pre-
requisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure" must receive ad-
ministrative or judicial preclearance. 
The Act defines voting to include "all 
action necessary to make a vote effec-
tive." For the purpose of evaluating 
changes made to a covered district's 
voting practices, the Act states that 
such changes should be compared 
against the practices that were in use in 
that jurisdiction on November 1, 1964. 
When the Act was created, Etowah 
County in Alabama employed the 
Etowah County Commission ("Etowah 
Commission") to oversee the mainte-
nance, repair, and construction of the 
county roads. The county was divided 
into four districts. A five-member 
commission was elected at large under 
a residency district system. Four mem-
bers would each receive an allotment 
of funds for discretionary spending on 
the roads in their respective districts. 
The Etowah Commission voted as a 
collective body to determine the initial 
allotments each of the four members 
- Shawn Gritz would receive. The fifth member was 
Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
s~n: ONLY PROCEDURAL 
CHANGES DIRECTLY RE-
LATED TO VOTING AND ELEC-
TION PROCESSES MAY OFFEND 
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT. 
After consolidating two Alabama 
cases, the United States Supreme Court 
held that changes in an elected official's 
authority did not require preclearance 
under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1973c (1975). In Presley v. Etowah 
County Commission, 112 S. Ct. 820 
(1992), the Court ruled that such a 
change must be directly related to vot-
the chairman who oversaw the solid 
waste authority, prepared the budget, 
and managed the courthouse buildings 
and grounds. 
In 1986, the Etowah Commission 
was restructured and increased to six 
members, with each member elected 
by the voters in a specific district. Four 
members ofthe new commission were 
holdovers from the previous commis-
sion. The newly-formed fifth district, 
which was designed to create a black 
majority district, elected a black man, 
Lawrence Presley. A black citizen had 
not previously held a seat on the Etowah 
Commission in the modem era. Shortly 
after the new members took office, the 
Etowah Commission passed the "Com-
mon Fund Resolution." This resolu-
tion effectively removed the individual 
authority from the commissioners. 
Instead of allocating monies to each 
commissioner, road funds were to be 
kept in common accounts. This al-
lowed a simple majority, such as the 
holdover members, to decide how to 
spend the funds. 
In the companion case from Russell 
County, Alabama, the Russell County 
Commission ("Russell Commission") 
originally comprised three commis-
sioners elected at large. The commis-
sioners were responsible for the road 
shops, crew, and equipment, as well as 
routine road maintenance, in their re-
spective districts. After one of the 
commissioners was indicted for cor-
ruption, the Russell Commission 
adopted the "Unit System" which rel-
egated control over road construction 
to a County Engineer appointed by the 
Commission. The Unit System was 
not submitted for preclearance under 
section 5 of the Act. 
The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Alabama 
issued a consent decree in 1985 which 
increased the Russell Commission to 
seven members and changed the elec-
tion system to district-by-district vot-
ing. The Department of Justice 
precleared the decree, but did not men-
tion the Unit System, which effec-
tively denied the commissioners con-
trol of the road funds and equipment. 
Ed Mack and Nathaniel Gosha were 
elected to the new seats and became the 
first black commissioners in modem 
times. 
The appellants, Presley, Mack, and 
Gosha, filed a single complaint in dis-
trict court which alleged thatthe county 
commissions had violated section 5 of 
the Act by not obtaining preclearance 
for either the Common Fund Resolu-
tion orthe Unit System. A three-judge 
panel convened by the district court 
found that neither the Common Fund 
Resolution nor the Unit System re-
quired preclearance under the Act. 
In reviewing the history of case law 
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on the Act, the Supreme Court restated 
that the Act was constitutional and that 
it required a broad interpretation to 
protect citizens' equal enjoyment of 
the right to vote. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 
827. Further, the Court noted that the 
Act was aimed to protect citizens from 
subtle, as well as obvious, state efforts 
to deny the right to vote. Id. 
The Court made clear that the ini-
tial step in analyzing claims under sec-
tion 5 was to determine whether, or 
not, the changes altered the election 
law. Id. at 828. The Court found four 
basic typologies indicative, though not 
exhaustive, of section 5 claims. Id. 
Those typologies involved changes af-
fecting the manner of voting, the can-
didacy requirements and qualifications, 
the composition of the electorate, or 
the creation or abolition ofan elective 
office. Id. As a general rule, the Court 
said that a change must have "a direct 
relation to voting and the election pro-
cess." Id. at 829. 
The appellants, joined by a brieffor 
the United States as amicus curie, ar-
gued that the Common Fund Resolu-
tion fell within the Act's coverage be-
cause the value of each vote had been 
diminished. Id. They reasoned that the 
value of each vote decreased because 
the authority of each commissioner 
decreased. Id. Thus, the redistricting 
system designed to ensure black repre-
sentation became a token gesture. 
The Court, however, defined vot-
ing power as being dependant upon 
increases or decreases in the number of 
officials, not in the individual power 
an official holds while in office. Id. 
The Court opined that without drawing 
a restrained line between governmen-
tal decisions affecting voting and those 
that do not, section 5 would become an 
omnipotent statute applicable to virtu-
ally all facets of governmental activity. 
Id. 
As to the Unit System, the Court 
found that delegating authority to an 
appointed official was possibly analo-
gous to the replacement of an elected 
official with an appointed one. Id. at 
830. Nevertheless, the Court held that 
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reallocations of authority within gov-
ernment could not constitute voting 
changes. Id. Furthermore, the Court 
stated that intraconstituency and 
interconstituency changes in authority 
may have affected voters, but neither 
case presented a change in voting for 
purposes of the Act. Id. at 831. 
The Court also recognized that the 
Attorney General's administrative in-
terpretation deserved considerable def-
erence, but noted that "[ d]eference does 
not mean acquiescence." Id. The 
Court determined that Congress un-
ambiguously stated that section 5 only 
covered changes in the rules governing 
voting. Id. at 833. As such, the Court 
found the Attorney General's position 
contrary to the Act and, therefore, not 
entitled to a high degree of deference. 
Id. 
The Court affirmed the decision of 
the district court but supplanted their 
own standard that a change must di-
rectly relate to the voting process to 
offend section 5. By making federal 
law more predictable to the states, the 
Court sought to enforce federalism as a 
''practical system of governance and 
not a mere poetic ideal." Id. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices White and Blackmun, 
pointed to the definition of "voting" 
given in the Act which includes "all 
action necessary to make a vote effec-
tive." Id. at 835 (emphasis added). 
Justice Stevens coupled this expansive 
language to the historical deprivation 
ofthe right to vote and created a litmus 
test for deciding whether section 5 
would apply. He concluded that when-
ever significant changes toward the 
disposition of power were made after a 
black person had assumed a position of 
power not historically held, those 
changes should be held suspect. Id. at 
838. 
It is likely that the Court will use 
cases such as these as mechanisms to 
federal restraint. By restrictively de-
fining key terms, the Supreme Court 
can severely curtail the social effects of 
federal legislation. The Voting Rights 
Act provided a system of quick review 
of suspect changes in power. Such 
claims may now be forced through the 
more expensive and circuitous court 
system. 
- Brett R. Wilson 
County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation: THE INDIAN GENERAL 
ALLOTMENT ACT PERMITS 
COUNTIES TO IMPOSE AD VA-
LOREM TAXES BUT NOT EX-
CISE TAXES ON PATENTED 
LAND OWNED BY TRIBES AND 
TRIBE MEMBERS. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court in County of 
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 
S. Ct. 683 (1992), upheld and remanded 
the decision ofthe Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals holding that the Indian 
General Allotment Act ("Act"), per-
mits a county to impose an ad valorem 
tax upon land patented in fee, but does 
not permit a county to impose an ex-
cise tax upon the sale of such land. 
After reviewing land allotment to In-
dian tribes since the seventeen hun-
dreds to establish the purpose of the 
Act and how Congress intended it to 
affect the Indian nations, the Court 
concluded the Act was not implicitly 
repealed by subsequent acts of Con-
gress. 
This case involved approximately 
1.3 million acres of land, mostly in 
Yakima County, of which eighty per-
cent was held in trust by the United 
States. The remaining twenty percent 
was held in fee patent by Indians and 
non-Indians. Most ofthe property was 
located in Yakima County, Washing-
ton. Yakima County ("the County") 
imposed an ad valorem levy on taxable 
real property and an excise tax upon 
the sale of the land held in fee patent. 
When Yakima IndianNation, ("Yakima 
Nation"), the owners, refused to pay 
these taxes, the County attempted to 
foreclose on their property. 
Yakima Nation sought injunctive 
and declaratory relief in the Federal 
District Court for Washington State on 
